I can’t understand why you Greek Cypriots are trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
-Alvaro de Soto, the UN secretary general’s special advisor on Cyprus
On April 24, Cypriots will have the opportunity to reject or approve UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s fifth and, apparently, final plan for a permanent settlement of the Cyprus issue. Virtually 30 years after the Greek attempt to overthrow the nation’s constitutional government, which provoked the Turkish invasion of the island and resulted in its de facto division into a Greek Cypriot south and Turkish Cypriot north, the results of the referendum will determine if this division of Cyprus will stand.
By all indications, it will. And only because the Greek Cypriots want it to. Since the final negotiations last month in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, on the secretary general’s plan, an intense, often pointless, and, worst of all, utterly irrational “debate” on the referendum — specifically, on its pros and cons for Greek Cypriots — has ensued. This debate has mostly avoided (or cynically suppressed) any honest examination of the options — at least by those calling for a “no” vote. Instead, it has proceeded on a basis of abstract (almost theological), simplistic, in many instances alarmist, and, most egregiously, racist argumentation and denunciation.
Anyone who has followed this “discussion” must be forgiven for thinking that rejection of the plan is motivated not by concern for Greek Cypriot interests, but by an overwhelming desire to cease dealing with the Cyprus issue at all in the future. The chief instigator, organizer, and manipulator of the Greek Cypriot rejectionist front is Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos, who, in an address two weeks ago, urged his fellow ethnics to reject the plan. Mr. Papadopoulos’s transparent cynicism has deeply angered the European Union in particular (in a caustic editorial last week, The Economist implied that he had not only misled the EU in the run-up to Cypriot accession to the Union, but was now brazenly deceiving his own electorate regarding post-referendum realities). That helps to explain why PASOK leader Giôrgos Papandreou placed his party’s timid, vague, and circuitous support of the Annan plan within the context of an EU framework for resolving all remaining legal and political issues between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. If Mr. Papandreou’s tortuous and characteristically incoherent backing of the UN plan was opportunistic and oblique, Greek prime minister Kôstas Karamanlês’s almost noncommittal and “discreet” approval was downright craven. “In the light of [Cyprus’s] future in the EU, the [plan’s] positive points may prove stronger than the negative ones,” Mr. Karamanlês said last Friday, but “…the final responsibility for their country’s future lies with the Cypriot citizens. We will respect their decision fully.” Mr. Karamanlês then warned that if “the plan is not accepted, the expression of popular will must be respected by all.” Well, yes, but….
The obvious objection is that while democratic nations respect the decisions of other democratic nations by definition, that doesn’t imply becoming accomplices to what are clearly wrongheaded — let alone dangerous — decisions. Greek Cypriots certainly have the right to vote against the Annan plan; but Greece, the European Union, and the world as a whole (which includes, lest we forget, Turkey) also have the right to disagree with that decision. More to the point, they have the right to work together to mitigate its worst consequences if they believe that it endangers a genuine resolution of the Cyprus issue — one, in other words, that takes into account the welfare and rights of both constituent ethnic communities in the country.
It was sad enough that Mr. Karamanlês’s studied ambiguity tried to absolve Greece from any consequences of a Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan; it was sadder still that he became an accessory to Mr. Papadopoulos. The Greek government’s “respect and full support for the decisions of the Cypriot people, as it was categorically expressed today, is for us particularly significant,” the Cypriot president said upon hearing of the Greek prime minister’s ostensible “dissent” from the former’s psycho-nationalist and — let us Greeks at least be frank about this — primitive crusade. (We should add that Mr. Karamanlês has gotten off to an inauspicious start in his first — and probably most important — foreign-policy test. If he had courageously decided to speak the truth to the Greek people and, most of all, to Mr. Papadopoulos, he would have gained tremendous political capital. We hope we are proven wrong, but we see here the kind of political cowardice in the face of public opinion that plagued and eventually undermined the Mêtsotakês government on the issue of Macedonia. We must also add that Mr. Karamanlês has not been served well in the current circumstances by his foreign minister, Petros Molyviatês.)
And when all else fails, play the anti-American card
And then there’s the Great Satan. Anti-Americanism suddenly seems to have become a central element in the debate. The US strongly supports the Annan proposal. Since it became clear that a possibly vast majority of Greek Cypriots oppose it, the US has exerted tremendous pressure on both Greece and Cyprus to back it openly. Politicians and the media in both Greece and Cyprus have seen this as another example of US interference in the region, and have embraced the “no” vote as a rare opportunity to resist and reject American power.
There is no doubt that this US pressure has blatantly violated diplomatic protocol. Only a naïf would ever expect the US to act within the normal bounds of diplomacy, however. As for the US ambassador in Athens, Thomas Miller, we already know that he considers himself to be the imperium’s proconsul in Græcia Capta. In the event, US diplomats have been systematically allowed to treat Greece and Cyprus as American protectorates for decades. But if there were ever an example of confusing oranges for apples, this is it.
greekworks.com is second to none in its direct, clear, and focused criticism of the US and US foreign policy. Nevertheless, as we never tire of repeating, we have never been — and could never be — anti-American (especially since most of us who write for this Website are Americans). We are, of course, opposed to many specific policies of the US government (not only foreign but domestic), but this opposition is part of what we consider (and hope) to be a coherent and more general critique of the US presence in the world. Rejecting the Annan proposal as a way of expressing opposition to the US and of flexing one’s muscles against US power is truly cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. Indeed, it is incomprehensible (and inexcusable) that Greeks would choose, of all things, the Annan plan as their ideological casus belli against the US. The bitter truth is that the only interest the US has in Cyprus is as a way to reinforce Turkish-US relations and put pressure on Greece. By voting against the Annan plan, Greek Cypriots — and their Greek co-conspirators — will, perversely, be abetting the US in both instances.
God in the details
The complexity and sheer bulk of the UN plan preclude a thorough presentation and discussion so late in the process. However, it has become clear by now that arguments for and against it have concentrated on a small number of issues. It is therefore astonishing that just a couple of days before the referendum, the majority of Greek Cypriots (and Greeks) appear to have no clear understanding of the most highly contentious elements, which, moreover, concern them the most: the continuing presence of Turkish troops, the return of roughly 200,000 displaced Greek Cypriots to their homes in the north, and the restitution of Greek Cypriot property lost during the invasion and subsequent colonization of the occupied areas.
We do not pretend to possess a comprehensive knowledge of the UN plan. We don’t think one is necessary, however, as several salient aspects are quite clear. Furthermore, we believe that the most important motivation for getting the plan right is precisely the willingness to get it right, which is why we’re so dismayed by the adventurism of all those clamoring for a “no” vote. The brutal fact is that a Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan proposal will result in the permanent division of the island.
Despite suggestions of further negotiations in the near or less-than-near future, there should be no illusions on that score, and anyone who peddles these illusions — Mr. Papadopoulos and his henchmen, primarily — are guilty of perpetrating a cruel and contemptible deception. If Greek Cypriots vote “no” in overwhelming numbers, any notion of a confederated and integrated state — let alone a federal and unified one — is dead in its tracks. Greek Cypriots will have obliterated 30 years of struggle for a solution to Cyprus‘s division within the framework of the Security Council’s resolutions on the issue. “We have been told by the Greek Cypriot side that any settlement has to be in conformity with United Nations Security Council resolutions,” Alvaro de Soto, the UN special advisor on Cyprus, told the Greek Cypriots this week, and then wondered out loud, “Now guess what? All of those things are in the plan…and…you are rejecting it….”
It doesn’t take a great flight of fancy to imagine a Greek Cypriot community more amenable to the UN plan if such accommodation had been a prerequisite for joining the EU. Which is why the EU now feels that it has been “taken for a ride” and “cheated” by Mr. Papadopoulos — both of these graphic descriptions come from Günter Verheugen, the EU commissioner for enlargement. It was clear from the outset of negotiations for Cypriot accession that entry into the EU was meant by the Union as a motivation for Greek Cypriots to move forward on a final resolution of the country’s ethnic division, not as a reward for obstructionism and unilateral rejection of all efforts at crafting a bicommunal administration that would ultimately develop into a bicommunal state. The EU is rightly exasperated by Mr. Papadopoulos, whose current position is seen as pure duplicity. This is especially the case because the Cypriot president has used the most outrageous language to disparage the Annan plan. Last week, the EU was taken aback by — and quickly denounced — Mr. Papadopoulos’s incendiary accusation that the plan was tantamount to “ethnic cleansing.” (Considering his notorious connections with Slobodan Miloseviç’s regime, one would think that Mr. Papadopoulos would be less shameless in his accusations.) All in all, it is now clear that Cyprus is entering a period of profound skepticism bordering on active isolation by the EU’s other member-states. To quote Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign-policy chief, “life will not be the same” for the Greek Cypriots if they continue in their obstinacy and “everyone has to know that.”
Among his other “assurances” to his fellow ethnics, Mr. Papadopoulos has asserted that EU member-states cannot confer state recognition on the Turkish Cypriot side if the Greek Cypriots reject the UN plan. True enough, except that there are many other nations in the world — including that Colossus bestriding the globe called the United States of America. Last week, state department spokesman Richard Boucher said that the US would not “leave the Turkish Cypriots out in the cold” if the Greek Cypriots voted “no.” Mr. Boucher did not elaborate, of course; he would have been foolish to do so. What is clear is that Azerbaijan’s recent announcement that it will recognize the Turkish Cypriot north as an independent state if Greek Cypriots reject the Annan compromise is the shape of things to come. And, by the way, Mr. Papadopoulos’s focus on the EU is another slap of ingratitude to loyal allies of the republic of Cyprus — in this case the third world, which has consistently and stalwartly supported the Greek Cypriots in the UN for decades.
And what happens if Greek Cypriots vote “yes”? First of all, Turkish troops stationed in the occupied north drop from 40,000 to 6,000. Mr. Papadopoulos sees this last figure as proof of the continuing Turkish threat to Cyprus. We see Mr. Papadopoulos’s analysis as proof of the lunacy of his position. One doesn’t need to be a military expert to know that in reality Turkey does not need any military presence on the island to constitute a threat (just as it didn’t in 1974). Turkey has the military capacity to devastate the republic of Cyprus within minutes by employing the forces it has at the ready on its Aegean coast just 40 miles from the island. The Annan plan, not at all coincidentally, also provides for the presence of 6,000 Greek troops on the island and foresees the reduction of that number to 3,000 for each side within seven years, to fall to 650 Turkish troops and 950 Greek troops after Turkey enters the EU.
On an equally sensitive matter, Mr. Papadopoulos has characterized the provisions regarding restitution of and compensation for lost property resulting from the island’s division as “financially unfavorable” for Greek Cypriots. The truth, as with most of the Cypriot president’s allegations, is fundamentally different. The Annan plan stipulates that the property within the area that returns to Greek Cypriot administration will be fully reclaimable. As for the property that remains within Turkish Cypriot administration, the plan allows Greek Cypriots to reclaim one-third and be compensated for the remaining two-thirds of their property, or to be compensated for the entire value of the property if they so choose. Obviously, the plan’s provisions for restitution and compensation may not be the most desirable solution possible — that is, total restitution of lost property or full compensation — but it is an exceedingly realistic one given the division of the country for the last three decades. More important, in terms of total Greek Cypriot properties lost after the invasion, the UN proposal provides for Greek Cypriots to reclaim two-thirds and be compensated for the remaining third. It is also important to reiterate that under the Annan plan, 120,000 Greek Cypriots — or 60 percent of the total — who became refugees will be able to return to their homes immediately. (If Greeks feel that these arrangements are unfair to their ethnic cousins in Cyprus, they should remember the Greek government’s treatment of the few Jews from Thessalonikê who survived the Holocaust and then tried to reclaim their properties after the war.)
The last major concern for Greek Cypriots is the number of Turkish settlers who will be allowed to stay permanently in Cyprus after the moratorium of 19 years expires. The possibility of the massive colonization of Cyprus by Turks, and the resulting “Turkification” of the island, constitutes, by far, the Greek Cypriots’ greatest fear. Mr. Papadopoulos has cynically fed this panic by suggesting that the proposed 5-percent limit on Greek and Turkish citizens who would be permitted to live in Cyprus after 19 years can easily be abrogated and therefore lead to the island’s future “de-Hellenization.” The problem is, again, that Mr. Papadopoulos is not only being economical with the truth, but that, as a lawyer, he knows it. The fact is that the legislation regarding aliens and immigration that becomes effective immediately upon implementation of the Annan plan cannot be overturned without approval of the Greek Cypriot majority of the lower house of the legislature. (If all this talk of “Turkification” and “de-Hellenization,” by the way, strikes the reader as uncomfortably racist, that’s because it is, which is why any further comment on this matter would not only be pointless but painful.)
In July of this year, Cyprus will mark 30 years of division, loss, and enmity — or it can celebrate the beginning of what will admittedly be a very long process of reconciliation that will include the free movement of people from one side to the other, the ability of many displaced Greek and Turkish Cypriots to return to their birthplaces, and the constitution for the first time in the island’s history of a civil society and a civic purpose that will integrate ethnic Turks and Greeks into one commonwealth. For almost 30 years, the reconstitution of Cyprus, and the reconciliation of its two peoples, was sabotaged by Rauf Denktash and the Turkish military. Now, as Turkey moves inexorably into a democratic future and, most important of all, as Turkish Cypriots themselves reject Mr. Denktash’s tutelage, Greek Cypriots seem ready to vote to legitimize everything that Mr. Denktash and the various Turkish juntas ever stood for, and to confirm all their worst demonizations of the Greek Cypriots. Last week, The Economist quoted an EU commission official as saying that the current situation in Cyprus was a “real shame” that could soon become a “real nightmare.” As Greeks, we are embarrassed by this state of affairs, and deeply offended by it — especially because it points to what might be a fundamental flaw in the Greek Cypriots’ own understanding not only of their future but, more relevantly, of their past and cultural heritage. We began this commentary with a doubt expressed by the UN’s chief representative on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto; we end it with a question Mr. de Soto asked the Greek Cypriots this week: “Is it understood in Cyprus what Europe is all about?”